Cognition, Vol. 9, No. 1

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The book is suitable both for independent study and for class use. Each unit ends with a Cultural Text which outlines an aspect of Swedish culture and, in nearly all cases, exemplifies and consolidates the grammar topic examined in the unit. Swedish-norwegian Union Crisis by Karl Nordlund. Author Karl Nordlund. Title Swedish-norwegian Union Crisis. Anarko-fascism: Naturen by Jonas Nilsson.

Title Anarko-fascism: Naturen.

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Hjalmar Branting

By far the biggest recipients of EU governance aid are the membership candidate states of Turkey and countries in the Western Balkans, in which priorities revolve around pre-accession preparation rather than democracy as such. While some believe technical governance cooperation can feed into broader political reforms, the EU has now been running these kinds of initiatives at a fairly large scale for two decades or more in countries whose records on democracy and human rights have become worse not better.

Many authoritarian regimes have received hundreds of millions of euros for such EU projects while tightening control over technical spheres. Some assessments conclude that this aid actually helps regimes stave off democratic reforms. The recipients of significant EU aid have in general not made progress in wrestling with corruption—if anything, their levels of corruption have worsened.

This lack of correlation applies to total aid amounts and to governance aid more specifically. EU interventions tend to support anticorruption agencies or specific anticorruption initiatives, when progress on corruption is a matter of wider institutional culture and quality. In Ukraine, the EU has put its stress mainly on anticorruption bodies, when the broader institutional deficiencies in democracy mean these cannot work as intended. In Moldova, corruption worsened most dramatically immediately afterthe country signed an association agreement with the union in June Moreover, companies from EU states figure disproportionately highly in bribery cases across the world.

EU security aims are making this problem worse. For example, the Tunisian government introduced new restrictions on the civil-society organization CSO sector, in part because the EU pressed Tunis to tighten finance-reporting rules, ostensibly to foreclose the possibility of funds getting through to terrorist groups. A much broader issue is that large-scale displacements caused by repression push the EU toward humanitarian rather than democracy support.

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The EU has in recent years provided emergency funding to people leaving their countries—the Rohingyas, Venezuelans, Syrians—far in excess of what it gives for promoting reform inside such states. The EU insists that upgrades to its counterterrorism work has spurred new local projects on countering extremism through better protection of human rights and through dozens of budget lines and funding initiatives that have increased funds available for rights work under a security label.

EU leaders routinely maintain that the priority focus on helping migrants return home with funding for reintegration programs is itself a service to human rights. Most independent observers reject this interpretation. It is questionable that the EU is justified in claiming that in this way it has advanced human rights and governance standards in the states where it has a heightened security presence.

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The analysis above points to a range of observations about the state of European support for democracy. Most importantly, it is clear that EU approaches need a critical update.

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In many instances, there is a mismatch between words and deeds. The bigger picture shows that many European policies may be working counter to the democracy assistance provided by the union and its member states. This suggests that those who believe that democracy is vital for development, peace, and respect for human rights need to focus on improving the place of democracy among macrolevel policy priorities.

There is also a clear mismatch between the key changes to the global context, on the one hand, and the way that EU policies have evolved, on the other. In a far less benign international environment, with a range of new conflicts and security challenges, the EU has not given up on democracy support. At a formal level, the main features of EU strategy have remained largely the same.

In modest ways, some EU tactics have improved and begun to focus necessarily on protecting democratic activists from repression. European governments have started to inject a more geopolitical tenor into the way they approach democracy support. But overall, the undramatic, incremental unfolding of EU democracy policies and the overwhelming focus on assistance to state institutions have not come close to matching the major and qualitative shifts in global politics.

It is highly unlikely that any of the trends outlined at the start of this paper—the plateauing of democracy, increased authoritarian influence, U. In light of this, a number of action points can be identified that EU member governments might usefully address in council conclusions and a new EU action plan on human rights and democracy.

These are specific improvements that the union could contemplate.

New council conclusions must focus on practical and operational action points rather than ending up as a document that simply repeats well-known tropes. These are undoubtedly true, but their infringement is not one of the main problems that beset EU democracy support. The following ten action points would help the union recalibrate its approach to supporting democracy. But given current international events and the challenges outlined above, the EU needs to fashion support for democracy more specifically as a tool for European security self-interest—and not simply allude to a foundational value for the union itself.

Both the EU institutions and EU member states should recognize this security logic in more specific and systematic terms.