Originally trained as a philosopher and orientialist, my research focuses on philosophical aspects of the religious traditions of ancient India. My research on Buddhist philosophy covers both theoretical metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language and normative aspects ethics ; I am also interested in the investigation of Buddhist meditative practice from the perspective of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.
Theology and Religion. Theology and Oriental Studies.
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Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction - Jan Westerhoff - Google книги
Further information College Documents Environmental Sustainability and Fairtrade Freedom of Information Freedom of Information How we make decisions Lists and registers Our policies and procedures The services we offer What our priorities are and how we are doing What we spend and how we spend it Who we are and what we do. Overseas Applicants. Graduate Why What Who Admissions criteria. Hayes, svabhava can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence". Some of the major topics discussed by classical Madhyamaka include causality , change, and personal identity.
In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field.
What is required is a kind of cognitive shift termed realization in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift. Much of Madhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various essentialist ideas have absurd conclusions through reductio ad absurdum arguments known as prasanga in Sanskrit. Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature [note 5] Mk. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' para-bhava , i. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature bhava.
If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent abhava. An important element of Madhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising the idea that every phenomena is dependent on other phenomena cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of causality and change.
For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change. We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. Conventionally, Madhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained. The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a nominal reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality, it is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.
This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily epistemological and depending on the cognition of the observer, not ontological. As Buddhapalita states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good".
The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual. Because the nature of ultimate reality is said to be empty, even of "emptiness" itself, along with the very framework of the two truths are also conventional realities, and not part of the ultimate. This is often called "the emptiness of emptiness" and refers to the fact that even though Madhyamikas speak of emptiness as the ultimate unconditioned nature of things, this emptiness is itself empty of any real existence. The two truths themselves are therefore just a practical tool used to teach others, but do not exist within the actual meditative equipoise that realizes the ultimate.
Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent, Nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither.
Centrists should know true reality That is free from these four possibilities. Atisha describes the ultimate as "here, there is no seeing and no seer, No beginning and no end, just peace It is nonconceptual and nonreferential Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception.
So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness [at all]. In Madhyamaka, reason and debate is understood as a means to an end liberation , and therefore it must be founded on the wish to help oneself and others end suffering. They only serve as conventional remedies for our delusions. If your objects are well established through valid cognitions, tell us how you establish these valid cognitions. If you think they are established through other valid cognitions, there is an infinite regress.
Then, the first one is not established, nor are the middle ones, nor the last. If these [valid cognitions] are established even without valid cognition, what you say is ruined. In that case, there is an inconsistency, And you ought to provide an argument for this distinction. Candrakirti comments on this statement by stating that Madhyamaka does not completely deny the use of pramanas conventionally, and yet ultimately they do not have a foundation:.
Therefore we assert that mundane objects are known through the four kinds of authoritative cognition.
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They are mutually dependent: When there is authoritative cognition, there are objects of knowledge; when there are objects of knowledge, there is authoritative cognition. But neither authoritative cognition nor objects of knowledge exist inherently. My words are without nature. Therefore, my thesis is not ruined. Since there is no inconsistency, I do not have to state an argument for a distinction.
Just as one magical creation may be annihilated by another magical creation, and one illusory person by another person produced by an illusionist, This negation is the same. However, conventionally one is still able to use the opponent's own reasoning apparatus to refute their theories and help them see their errors. This remedial deconstruction does not replace their theories with another one, but simply dissolves all views, including the very fictional system of epistemic warrants pramanas used to establish them.
But Madhyamaka is not annihilating something, merely elucidating that this true existence never existed in the first place. Thus, Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts. For Madhyamaka, the realization of emptiness is not just a satisfactory theory about the world, but a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation or nirvana. With the cessation of ignorance, formations will not arise.
Moreover, the cessation of ignorance occurs through right understanding.
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Through the cessation of this and that [link of dependent origination] this and that [other link] will not come about. The entire mass of suffering thereby completely ceases. Liberation moksa results from the cessation of actions karman and defilements klesa. Actions and defilements result from representations vikalpa. False imagining stops in emptiness sunyata. Therefore, the ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but to gain a liberated mind which does not cling to anything.
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To realize this, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of both self , objects and mental states,  culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom. In order to guide beginners a method is taught, comparable to the steps of a staircase that leads to perfect Buddhahood. Ultimate reality is only to be entered once we have understood seeming reality.
If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault.
Since I have no position, I am not at fault at all. If there were anything to be observed through direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition], it would be something to be established or rejected. However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized. Those whose minds have no standpoint, will not be caught. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.
In the middle, one puts an end to identity.